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A study of distortions to agricultural incentives in 18 developing countries during 1960-84, 
by Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1988; 1991), found that policies in most of those developing 
countries were directly or indirectly harming their farmers. Since the mid-1980s there has 
been a substantial amount of policy reform and opening up of many developing countries, 
and indicators of that progress have been made available recently by a new study that has 
compiled estimates for a much larger sample of developing countries and for as many years 
as possible since 1955. The new study also covers Europe’s transition economies and 
comparable estimates for high-income countries, thereby covering more than 90 percent of 
world agricultural output and employment. This paper summarizes the methodology used in 
the new study (pointing out similarities and differences with those used by the OECD and by 
Krueger, Schiff and Valdés), compares a synopsis of the indicators from Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdés and the new study for the period to 1984, summarizes the changing extent of price 
distortions across countries and commodities globally since then, and concludes by 
evaluating the degree of distortion reduction over the years since 1984 compared with how 
much still remains, according to the results of a global economy wide model. 
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Two decades ago, a major World Bank study of distortions to agricultural incentives 
in 17 developing countries plus Portugal was published by Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 
(1988; 1991). That study covered roughly the period 1960-84, which for many 
developing countries was the first 25 years of independence from a colonial power. It 
found that policies in most of those developing countries were harming their farmers, 
either directly via such things as taxes on agricultural exports or indirectly via 
manufacturing protection or overvalued exchange rates.  
Since the mid-1980s there has been a substantial amount of policy reform and 
opening up of many developing countries, but no systematic quantitative monitoring 
of those policy changes. To help fill this lacuna, a study by the World Bank has 
revisited this issue and provides indicators for a much larger sample of developing 
countries and for as many years as possible since 1955. The new study also covers 
European economies in transition from socialism and, for completeness, it extends 
estimates for high-income countries back three decades prior to the start of 
comparable estimates from 1986 by the Organization for Economic  Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). In so doing it covers more than 90 percent of world 
agricultural output and employment, with the focus countries accounting for 96 
percent of global GDP.  
Some of the policy developments of the past half century have happened quite 
suddenly and been transformational. They include the end of colonization around 
1960, the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe from 1962, 
the floating of exchange rates and associated liberalization, deregulation, privatization 
and democratization in the mid-1980s in many countries, and the opening of China in 
1979, Vietnam in 1986, and Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Less newsworthy and hence less 
noticed are the influences of policies that change only gradually in the course of 2 
 
economic development as comparative advantages evolve, but they too have made a 
substantial impact on the global economy.  
The present article is structured as follows. It begins with some background 
comments before summarizing the methodology used in the World Bank’s new study, 
pointing out its similarities and differences with those used by the OECD and by 
Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (K/S/V). It compares a synopsis of the indicators from 
K/S/V and the new study for the period to 1984, before summarizing the changing 
extent of price distortions across countries and commodities regionally and globally 
since then. The third section reports results from a global economy wide modeling 
exercise aimed at quantifying the trade and welfare effects of the reduction in price 
and trade distortions over the years since 1984 compared with the prospective effects 
of removing remaining distortions to agricultural and other merchandise trade. The 
final section concludes with some observations on what might influence the prospects 






For decades agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income (and some middle-
income) countries have been depressing international prices of farm products, which 
lowers the earnings of farmers and associated rural businesses in developing 
countries. The 1958 Haberler report to Contracting Parties to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade forewarned that such distortions might worsen, and indeed they 
did between the 1950s and the early 1980s in East Asia (Anderson, Hayami and 
Others 1986). Such policies depress international prices for farm products, thereby 
adding to global inequality and poverty because three-quarters of the world’s poorest 
people live in poorer countries and depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for 
their main income (World Bank 2008).  
In addition to this external policy influence on rural poverty, the governments 
of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-
century. A well-known example is the taxing of exports of plantation crops in post-
colonial Africa (Bates). At the same time, many developing countries chose also to 
overvalue their currency, and to pursue an import-substituting industrialization 3 
 
strategy by restricting imports of manufactures. Together those latter measures 
indirectly taxed producers of other tradable products in developing economies, by far 
the most numerous of them being farmers (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 1988; 1991). 
Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been 
depressed by both own-country and other countries’ agricultural price and 
international trade policies. 
This disarray in world agriculture, as Johnson described it in the title of his 
seminal 1973 book, means there has been over-production of farm products in high-
income countries and under-production in low-income countries. It also means there 
has been less international trade in farm products than would be the case under free 
trade, thereby thinning markets for these weather-dependent products and thus making 
them more volatile. Using a stochastic model of world food markets, Tyers and 
Anderson (table 6.14) found that instability of international food prices in the early 
1980s was three times greater than it would have been under free trade in those 
products.  
During the past 25 years, however, numerous countries have begun to reform 
their agricultural price and trade policies, typically as part of a broader reform agenda. 
That has raised the extent to which farm products are traded internationally, but not 
nearly as fast as globalization has proceeded in the non-farm sectors of the world’s 
economies.
1
To what extent have reforms of the past two decades reversed the above-
mentioned policy developments of the previous three decades? Empirical indicators of 
agricultural price distortions (called Producer Support and Consumer Subsidy 
Estimates, or PSEs and CSEs) have been provided in a consistent way since 1986 by 
the Secretariat of the OECD (2008) for its 30 member countries. However, until now 
there have been no comprehensive time series rates of assistance to producers of 
nonagricultural goods to compare with those PSEs, nor do they tell us what happened 
in those advanced economies in earlier decades – which are of more immediate 
relevance if we are to see how the two groups of countries’ policies developed during 
similar stages of development. As for developing countries, almost no comparable 
  
                                                 
1 In the two decades to 2000-04, the value of global exports as a share of GDP rose from 19 to 26 
percent, even though most of GDP is nontradable governmental and other services, while the share of 
primary agricultural production exported globally, including intra-European Union trade, rose from 
only 13 percent to just 16 percent (World Bank 2007 and FAO, as summarized in Sandri, Valenzuela 
and Anderson). 4 
 
time series estimates have been generated since the Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) 
study, which covered the period 1960-1984 for just 17 developing countries plus 
Portugal.
2
The World Bank’s new Database of Agricultural Distortions (Anderson and 
Valenzuela) complements and extends those efforts by OECD and IFPRI and the 
seminal K/S/V study. It builds on them by providing similar estimates for other 
significant (including many low-income) developing economies, by developing and 
estimating new, more comprehensive policy indicators, and by providing estimates of 
nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) for non-agricultural tradables to compare with 
those for the farm sector.
 An exception is a recent set of estimates of nominal rates of protection 
generated by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) for key farm 
products in China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam since 1985 (Orden et al.). The OECD 
(2009) also has released PSEs for Brazil, China and South Africa as well as several 
more East European countries.  
3 This new database includes estimates for 75 countries that 
together account for between 90 and 96 percent of the world’s population, farmers, 
agricultural GDP and total GDP (table 1). The sample countries also account for more 
than 85 percent of farm production and employment in each of Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, and their spectrum 
of per capita incomes ranges from the poorest (Zimbabwe and Ethiopia) to among the 
richest (Norway).
4 NRAs and consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) are estimated for 
more than 70 different farm products, with an average of nearly a dozen per country. 
In aggregate the coverage represents around 70 percent of the gross value of 
agricultural production in the focus countries,
5
                                                 
2 A nine-year update for the Latin American countries in the Krueger, Schiff and Valdés sample by the 
same country authors, and a comparable study of seven central and eastern European countries, contain 
estimates at least of direct agricultural distortions (see Valdés 1996; 2000). The Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdés (1991) chapters on Ghana and Sri Lanka have protection estimates back to 1955, as does the 
study by Anderson, Hayami and Others for Korea and Taiwan (and Japan, and much earlier in the case 
of rice).  
 and just under two-thirds of global 
3 These estimates and associated analytical narratives are discussed in far more detail in a global 
overview volume (Anderson), and the detailed developing country case studies are reported in four 
regional volumes covering Africa (Anderson and Masters), Asia (Anderson and Martin 2009a), Latin 
America (Anderson and Valdés) and Europe’s transition economies (Anderson and Swinnen). 
4 The only countries not well represented in the sample are those in the Middle East and the many small 
ones, but in total the omitted countries account for less than 4 percent of the global economy (made up 
of 0.2 percent from each of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 0.9 percent from Latin America, and the rest 
from the Middle East and North Africa). 
5 Had seven key mostly-nontraded food staples (bananas, cassava, millet, plantain, potato, sweet potato 
and yam) been included for all instead of just some developing countries, their product coverage would 
have risen from around 70 to 76 percent; and had those staples had an average NRA of zero, they 
would have brought the weighted average NRA for all covered agriculture in developing countries only 5 
 
farm production valued at undistorted prices over the period covered. Not all countries 
had data for the entire 1955-2007 period, but the average number of years covered is 
41 per country.
6
North America and Europe (including the newly acceded eastern members of 
the European Union (EU)) each account for one-third of global GDP, and the 
remaining one-third is shared almost equally by developing countries and the other 
high-income countries. When the focus turns to just agriculture, however, developing 
countries are responsible for around three-fifths of value added globally, with Asia 
accounting for over half of that lion’s share. The developing countries’ majority 
becomes stronger still in terms of global population and even more so in terms of 
number of farmers, almost three-quarters of whom are in Asian developing countries. 
Hence there is a vast range of per capita incomes and agricultural land per capita, and 
thus agricultural comparative advantages, across the country groups listed in table 1.  
 Of the world’s 30 most valuable agricultural products, the NRAs 
cover 77 percent of global output, ranging from two-thirds for livestock, three-
quarters for oilseeds and tropical crops, and five-sixths for grains and tubers. Those 
products represent an even higher share (85 percent) of global agricultural exports. 
Having such a comprehensive coverage of countries, products and years offers the 
prospect of obtaining a reliable picture of both long-term trends in policies, and 
annual fluctuations around those trends, for individual countries and commodities as 
well as for country groups, regions, and the world as a whole.  
Asia has had much faster economic growth and export-led industrialization 
than the rest of the world: since 1980, Asia’s per capita GDP has grown at four times, 
and exports nearly two times, the global averages, and the share of Asia’s GDP that is 
exported is now one-third above that for the rest of the world and for Latin America 
and far above that for Africa. Asia’s GDP per capita is now half as high again as that 
of our focus African countries, although still only one-third that of Latin America. 
However, in the earlier half of our time series Asia was poorer than Africa and hence 
the poorest of the country groups in table 1. 
                                                                                                                                            
about half of one percentage point closer to zero each decade over the sample period (Anderson, table 
12.10). 
6 By way of comparison, the seminal multi-country study of agricultural pricing policy by Krueger, 
Schiff and Valdés (1988; 1991) covered an average of 4.3 products for 23 years to the mid-1980s for 
each of its 18 focus countries that together accounted for 6 percent of global agricultural output; and 
the producer and consumer support estimates of the OECD (2008) cover 22 years for its 30 countries 
that account for just over one-quarter of the world’s agricultural output valued at undistorted prices. 6 
 
By 2000-04 just 12 percent of Asian developing country GDP came from 
agriculture on average. That contrasts with Africa where the share for our focus 
countries ranges from 20 to 40 percent, and with Latin America and Europe’s 
transition economies where it is down to 6 percent (and to just 2 percent on average in 
high-income countries). The share of employment in agriculture remains very high in 
Asia though, at just under 60 percent – which is the same as in Africa and three times 
the share in Latin America and Eastern Europe, although more farmers work part-time 
on their farms in Asia than in other developing countries so these data understate the 
productivity of labor on Asian farms. By contrast, less than 4 percent of workers in 
high-income countries are still engaged in agriculture (Sandri, Valenzuela and 
Anderson 2007). Hence both own-country and rest-of-world distortions to agricultural 
incentives are of great importance to not only African but also Asian developing 
country welfare, inequality and poverty. 
 
 





The study’s methodology focuses mainly on government-imposed distortions that 
create a gap between a country’s domestic prices and the prices of like tradable 
products at the country’s border (or, in the case of nontradable farm products, what 
they would be in the absence of domestic price subsidies or taxes). Since it is not 
possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral 
view alone, not only are the effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including 
distortions in the foreign exchange market) examined, but also those of distortions in 
non-agricultural tradable sectors.  
Specifically, the NRA for each farm product is computed as the percentage by 
which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they 
would be without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0).
8
                                                 
7 Only a brief summary of the methodology is provided here. For details see Anderson et al. or 
Anderson (Appendix A). 
 
8 Such a distortion creates an economic cost to society which can be estimated using welfare measures 
techniques such as those pioneered by Harberger, who notes that this focus allows a great 
simplification in evaluating the marginal costs of a set of distortions: changes in economic costs can be 
evaluated taking into account the changes in volumes directly affected by such distortions, ignoring all 
other changes in prices. In the absence of divergences such as externalities, the measure of a distortion 7 
 
Included are estimates of the output-price equivalent of product-specific input 
subsidies. A weighted average NRA for all covered products for a country is derived 
using the value of production at undistorted prices as product weights. Those 
production weights are also used to obtain weighted average NRAs across countries 
for individual or sets of products.  
While most of the focus is on agricultural producers, we also consider the 
extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, we calculate a CTE by 
comparing the price that consumers pay for their food and the international price of 
each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE arise 
from distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and 
taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate 
level) to differ from those received by producers. In the absence of any other 
information, the CTE for each tradable covered farm product is assumed to be the 
same as the NRA from border distortions, and the CTE for nontradable farm products 
is assumed to be zero. The value of consumption at undistorted prices is used to 
obtain product weights to generate weighted average CTEs across products or 
countries.
9
To the NRA for covered products is added a ‘guesstimate’ of the NRA for 
non-covered products (on average around 30 pecent of the total) and an estimate of 




                                                                                                                                            
is the gap between the price paid and the price received, irrespective of whether the level of these 
prices is affected by the distortion. 
 Since the 1980s some high-income countries’ governments have also 
Other developments that change incentives facing producers and consumers can include flow-
on consequences of the distortion, but these should not be confused with the direct price distortion 
estimated here. If, for instance, a country is large in world trade for a given commodity, imposition of 
an export tax may raise the price in international markets, reducing the adverse impact of the distortion 
on producers in the taxing country. Another flow-on consequence is the effect of trade distortions on 
the real exchange rate, which is the price of traded goods relative to non-traded goods. Neither of these 
flow-on effects are of immediate concern, however, because if the direct distortions are accurately 
estimated, they can be incorporated as price wedges into an appropriate country or global economy-
wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which in turn will be able to capture the full 
general equilibrium impacts (inclusive of real exchange rate effects) of the various direct distortions to 
producer and consumer prices. Such price wedges are provided for 2004 by Valenzuela and Anderson, 
and are used in a global CGE model by Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (results from 
which are summarized below). 
9 Again this is valued at the farmgate level, following the OECD’s approach. The CTE so estimated is 
probably larger in ad valorem terms than it would be had it been estimated at the retail level, but may 
be smaller in dollar terms depending on the nature of markups along the value chain. 
10 Not all country authors were able to estimate all farm input subsidies, and, following the OECD, no 
authors included subsidies to water use. India has relatively large input subsidies, but even there they 
added only a few percentage points to the NRA. In some cases input subsidies would have been more 8 
 
provided so-called ‘decoupled’ assistance to farmers but, because that support in 
principle does not distort resource allocation, its NRA has been computed separately 
and is not included for direct comparison with the NRAs for other sectors or for 
developing countries. Each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a 
producer of exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes 
changing over the years), so as to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs 
for the two different groups of tradable farm products. We also generate a production-
weighted average NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for 
agricultural tradables via the calculation of a percentage Relative Rate of Assistance 
(RRA), defined as: 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the 
agricultural (including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.
11
This approach is not well suited to analysis of the policies of Europe’s or 
Asia’s former socialist economies prior to their reform era, because prices then played 
only an accounting function and currency exchange rates were enormously distorted. 
During their reform era, however, the price comparison approach provides as valuable 
a set of indicators for them as for other market economies of distortions to incentives 
 
Since the NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, 
neither can the RRA (since the weighted average NRAnonag
t is non-negative in all 
our country case studies). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is 
zero. This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an 
internationally comparable indication of the extent to which a country’s sectoral 
policy regime has an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias.  
                                                                                                                                            
or less than offset by restrictions on imports of intermediate inputs (or by imperfect domestic 
competition in their provision, e.g. by para-statal monopolies). Hence their fuller estimation for other 
countries is unlikely to have made much difference to the aggregate NRA for developing country 
agriculture, particularly in poorer countries where only the wealthiest farmers are major users of 
modern inputs. Had the focus been on effective rates of assistance to value added, the extent of rate 
under-estimation could have been greater, but that is irrelevant for the present purpose where the focus 
is on nominal rates. 
11 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives 
nonagricultural producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government 
assistance that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner provided his Symmetry 
Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. 
This carries over to a model that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables (Vousden, pp. 
46-47). 9 
 
for farm production, consumption and trade, and of the income transfers associated 
with interventions.
12
In addition to the mean NRA, a measure of the dispersion or variability of the 
NRA estimates across the covered farm products also is generated for each economy. 
The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource 
misallocation tend to be greater the greater the degree of substitution in production. In 
the case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but 
transferable among farm activities, the greater the variation of NRAs across industries 
within the sector then the higher will be the welfare cost of those market 
interventions. A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard deviation of the covered 
industries’ NRAs.  
  
Anderson and Neary show that it is possible to develop a single index that 
captures the extent to which the mean and standard deviation of protection together 
contribute to the welfare cost of distortionary policies. That index recognizes that the 
welfare cost of a government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the 
price wedge, and so is larger than the mean and is positive regardless of whether the 
government’s agricultural policy is favoring or hurting farmers. In the case where it is 
only import restrictions that are distorting agricultural prices, the index provides a 
percentage tariff equivalent which, if applied uniformly to all imports, would generate 
the same welfare cost as the actual intra-sectoral structure of protection from import 
competition. Lloyd, Croser and Anderson show that, once NRAs and CTEs have been 
calculated, they can be used to generate such an index even in the more complex 
situation where there may be domestic producer or consumer taxes or subsidies in 
addition to not only import tariffs but any other trade taxes or subsidies or quantitative 
restrictions. They call it a Welfare Reduction Index (WRI). Such a measure is the 
percentage agricultural trade tax (or uniform NRA and CTE) which, if applied equally 
to all agricultural tradables, would generate the same reduction in national economic 
welfare as the actual intra-sectoral structure of distortions to domestic prices of 
tradable farm goods. They show also that, if one is willing to assume that domestic 
price elasticities of supply (demand) are equal across farm commodities, then the only 
information needed to estimate the WRI, in addition to the NRAs and CTEs, is the 
                                                 
12 Data availability also affects the year from which NRAs can be computed. For Europe’s transition 
economies that starting date is 1992 (2000 for Kazahkstan), for Vietnam it is 1986 and for China it is 
1981. 10 
 
share of each commodity in the domestic value of farm production (consumption) at 
undistorted prices. 
  To obtain dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation, we have 
taken the country authors’ NRA estimates and multiplied them by the gross value of 
production at undistorted prices to obtain an estimate in US dollars of the direct gross 
subsidy equivalent of assistance to farmers (GSE). These GSE values are calculated in 
constant dollars, and are also expressed on a per-farm-worker basis. Likewise a value 
of the consumer transfer is derived from the CTE, by assuming the consumption value 
is the gross value of production at undistorted prices divided by the self-sufficiency 
ratio for each product (production divided by consumption, derived from national 
volume data or the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’s) commodity balance 
sheets). These transfer values are helpful for generating an estimate of the 
contribution of each policy instrument to the overall NRA, and the trade data that 
provide the self-sufficiency ratio helped each country author attach a trade status to 
each product each year (bearing in mind also the likely impact of the NRAs and CTEs 
on the observed self-sufficiency ratio). 
Once each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a 
producer of exportables, or as producing a non-tradable, it is possible to generate for a 
given year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of tradable farm 
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where  m NRAag  and  x NRAag  are the average NRAs for the import-competing and 
exportable parts of the agricultural sector (their weighted average being 
t NRAag ). 
This index has a value of zero when the import-competing and export sub-sectors are 
equally assisted, and its lower bound approaches -1 in the most extreme case of an 
anti-trade policy bias. 
Part of the anti-trade bias in developing countries in the past was the result of 
government intervention in the domestic market for foreign currency. The most 
common arrangement was a dual exchange rate, whereby exporters had to sell part or 
all of their foreign currency to the government at a low price. This effectively taxed 
and thus discouraged production of exportables. At the same time it created an 11 
 
artificial shortage of foreign currency so that potential importers bid up its purchase 
price, which had the same effect as an import tax and thus encouraged import-
competing production (Dervis, de Melo and Robinson). The size of these effective if 
implicit trade taxes depends on the extent to which the government purchase price 
differs from what would be the free-market equilibrium price, the price elasticities of 
demand for and supply of foreign currency, and the retention rate (the extent of the 
requirement to sell a portion to the government). In some countries there were more-
complex multiple exchange rates, whereby traders of some products were subject to 
more favorable treatment than others. In estimating NRAs in developing countries, 
participants in the Agricultural Distortions project endeavored to include the effects of 
these implicit trade taxes, and to show how much impact they had on the NRAs and 
RRA. The practice was rife in newly independent developing countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but was gradually phased out over the 1980s and early 1990s as part of 
overall macroeconomic policy reform initiatives.
13
Anderson and Neary also show that it is possible to develop a single index that 
captures the extent to which import protection reduces the volume of trade. Once 
NRAs and CTEs have been calculated, Lloyd, Croser and Anderson show how they 
can be used to generate a more-general Trade Reduction Index (TRI) that allows for 
the trade effects also of domestic price-distorting policies, and regardless of whether 
they (or the trade measures) are positive or negative. Such a measure is the percentage 
agricultural trade tax (or uniform NRA and CTE) which, if applied equally to all 
agricultural tradables, would generate the same reduction in sectoral trade volume as 
the actual intra-sectoral structure of distortions to domestic prices of tradable farm 
goods. They show also that, if the domestic price elasticities of supply (demand) are 
equal across farm commodities, then the only information needed to estimate the TRI, 
in addition to the NRAs and CTEs, is the share of each commodity in the domestic 
value of farm production (consumption) at undistorted prices. 
  
                                                 
13 There were many other reasons for exchange rate movements which affected the international 
competitiveness of farmers, but they also affected producers of other tradable products. Where they are 
due to the actions of international borrowers and lenders (as in the 1990s in Latin America – see Quiros 
and Opazo), they cannot be interpreted as price distortions in the same way as captured in NRA 
estimation. Where misalignment arises because of government macroeconomic policy, such as a delay 
in the adjustment of a fixed exchange rate when the government increases its borrowing from abroad, 
symmetric treatment of any such “overvaluation” during a heavy borrowing period would require 
taking into account exchange rate “undervaluation” during periods of low foreign borrowing or 
repayment of foreign debt. For these reasons, we do not follow K/S/V in including deviations of real 
exchange rates from benchmark values unless these deviations arise from direct distortions as with dual 
or multiple exchange rates. 12 
 
Needless to say, there are numerous challenges in applying the above 
methodology, especially in less developed economies with poor-quality data. Ways to 
deal with the standard challenges are detailed in Anderson et al. and the country-
specific challenges are discussed in the analytical narratives in the regional and global 
volumes listed in footnote 3 above. 
The NRAs and CTEs are similar to the PSEs and CSEs computed by OECD 
(2008), except that each of the OECD’s measures is expressed as a percentage of the 
distorted rather than the undistorted price. Thus, it is lower than the comparable NRA 
or CTE, and has a maximum value of 100 percent. The OECD does not attempt to 
estimate rates of distortion to prices of non-covered farm products, thereby implicitly 
assuming they are the same as the average for the roughly 70 percent of farm 
production that is covered by direct price comparisons. Nor does the OECD take into 
account distortions to non-farm sectors or to the market for foreign exchange, and it 
does not estimate indicators such as the WRI and TRI.  
The estimates by Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1988; 1991) distinguish for each 
country a ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ rate of ‘protection’ as measures of distortion to 
agricultural incentives. Their ‘direct’ rate is not identical to the agricultural NRA 
described above, but is the closest for comparative purposes.
14
                                                 
14 Formally, K/S/V’s ‘direct protection’ measure is the ratio of (a) the difference between the relative 
producer price and the relative border price and (b) the relative adjusted border price measured at the 
equilibrium exchange rate and in the absense of all trade policies, where the ‘relative price’ refers to the 
price of the farm product relative to the price of all non-farm products. 
 Their ‘indirect’ rate is 
the number of percentage points by which the ‘direct’ rate for each product, or the 
production-weighted average for a country’s covered farm products, should be 
reduced because of the adverse macroeconomic influence on farmer incentives of that 
country’s non-farm policies (most notably protection to the manufacturing sector and 
overvaluation of the country’s currency). Their ‘total protection’ rate, therefore, is not 
identical to the above RRA, but again it is the closest for comparative purposes. It is 
not identical to the RRA partly because the K/S/V measure is an attempt to estimate 
econometrically the indirect effect on farm distortions of those non-farm policies, 
whereas the RRA explicitly uses an estimate of the NRA for non-farm tradable sectors 
alongside the estimated NRA for the tradable farm sector and both of those NRAs 
explicitly incorporate an estimate of the trade-taxing effect of multiple exchange rates. 
Since there are now plenty of sectoral and economy wide models of national and 
global markets available, the study summarized in Anderson leaves it to modelers to 13 
 
determine how much the estimated domestic price distortions influence a country’s 
real exchange rate and the international relative price of farm products (see footnote 8 
above). The other important differences between the K/S/V study and that 
summarized in Anderson are that the former’s product sample is smaller, its country 
sample is smaller (in particular, it omits the biggest developing countries of China, 
India and Indonesia), and it provides only unweighted averages of distortions to 
farmer incentives across its developing countries.  
 
 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Developing Countries before 1985 
 
 
We turn now to summarizing first the stylized facts that emerged from K/S/V for the 
period to 1984 as compared with the findings of Anderson and Valenzuela’s (2008) 
compilation and aggregation of NRAs and related indicators. We begin by focusing 
on just those developing countries included in the K/S/V sample, and then show how 
much the new estimates for the fuller sample of 41 developing countries differ from 
those for the more-limited K/S/V sample of 17 countries. We leave until the following 
two sections a discussion of the estimates for more-advanced economies pre-1985, 
and of the period since the K/S/V era for both sets of countries.  
The key empirical findings from the study by Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 
(1988; 1991) and their authors’ detailed country case studies are based on the 
estimates shown in table 2, for 4 groups of countries classified according to their level 
of national per capita income at the time.  
The most important findings, based on the unweighted average estimates 
across developing countries for the entire period from 1960 to 1984 roughly (see exact 
years for each country in note b of table 2), are: 
•  The direct rate of assistance (DRA) to farmers, due to agricultural policies, 
was negative (average DRA of -8 percent), but tended to be more negative the 
lower a country’s per capita income (as low as -23 percent for the lowest-
income group, but +24 percent for the highest-income group); 14 
 
•  Even more important were non-agricultural policies, particularly 
manufacturing protection, which on average were three times as harmful to 
farmers as agricultural policies;  
•  Thus direct plus indirect policy influences mean that developing country 
farmers faced prices that were an estimated 30 percent below what they would 
have been without distortionary farm price, trade and exchange rate policies 
on average; and 
•  Within the agricultural sector, the producers of exportables tended to be taxed 
by agricultural policies (average DRA of -12 percent) and those producing 
import-competing farm products tended to be protected (average DRA of 16 
percent) but, when the indirect impact is included (which reduces the DRA by 
23 percentage points), the TRA for both sub-sectors were negative on average 
for the 17 countries and for all but Group IV countries (South Korea and 
Portugal). 
For the K/S/V sample of 17 developing countries and the period 1960-84, there was 
therefore a severe anti-trade bias in farm policies and also a severe anti-agricultural 
bias that was reinforced by non-farm policies, particularly manufacturing protection; 
and the biases against farmers – especially those capable of exporting – tended to be 
greater the lower the national per capita income. 
The unweighted NRAs and RRAs in the recent World Bank project, for the 
same developing countries and years, are shown in part (b) of table 2. The estimates 
of agricultural NRAs, however, include a bigger sample of covered products (more 
than twice as many as in K/S/V including livestock products which were mostly 
ignored in K/S/V). The total agricultural NRAs (but not the NRAs for exporting and 
import-competing farmers) also include, unlike in K/S/V, non-product-specific 
assistance and guesstimates of assistance to the roughly 30 percent of the value of 
farm products that has not been included in the new study’s explicit price comparison 
exercise. Recall too that the NRA estimates incorporate the trade-taxing effects of 
multiple exchange rates, hence they can be expected to have more of an anti-trade bias 
than K/S/V’s DRA measure.  
The new NRA and RRA estimates reinforce the conclusions from K/S/V for 
the period to 1984. Specifically, the new agricultural NRAs are very similar to the 
comparable DRAs (both averaging -8 percent, and within 4 percentage points for the 15 
 
four income groups). Second, non-agricultural policies were even more important in 
depressing the new RRA than agricultural policies, with their NRA averaging 34 
percent compared with the average NRA for agriculture of -8 percent. Third, the 
estimated direct plus indirect policy influences on farmers’ incentives on average are 
very similar in the two studies: a TRA of -30 percent by K/S/V, and an RRA of -29 
percent from the new study. And fourth, as anticipated (because of the inclusion of the 
impact of multiple exchange rates), within the agricultural sector the new NRA for 
producers of exportables is more negative than the DRA (average NRA of -25 
compared with a DRA of -12 percent). However, the new NRA for producers of 
import-competing farm products is lower rather than higher than the DRA except for 
Group IV countries. This is mainly because of the broader product coverage in the 
new dataset, plus the estimated presence of import subsidies for some food staples in 
Zambia. Nevertheless, the trade bias index for each of the four income groups is 
shown in the final column of table 2 to be more negative based on the new NRAs than 
on K/S/V’s DRAs, such that the average over the 17 countries is one-quarter larger for 
the new estimates (-0.30 compared with -0.24). 
The comparison between parts (a) and (b) of table 2 thus suggests the new 
agricultural NRAs and RRAs are indeed similar in magnitude to the K/S/V’s DRA 
and TRA. That gives us confidence to ask two further questions. One, to be delayed 
until the next section, is how have distortions in those 17 developing countries 
changed since the mid-1980s? The other is: How much do those average NRAs and 
RRAs for just 17 countries to 1984 change when the new database’s fuller sample of 
41 developing countries is included?
15
                                                 
15 Turkey is not included in the developing country grouping hereafter, but rather with the European 
transition economies. 
 Table 3 includes 5-year average NRAs by 
geographic region for the full time series, where it is again apparent that the NRAs 
tend to be higher, the higher a region’s income per capita (indicated in column 1). It is 
also apparent that the NRA trend over the period 1960 to 1984 was flat for each of the 
three developing country regions. For developing countries as a whole during 1960-
1984, their weighted average NRA was -22 percent, which compares with an 
unweighted average NRA (and DRA) of -8 percent in the K/S/V sample of countries 
for most of that period. This inclusion of more developing countries in the sample, 
including from Sub-Saharan Africa but especially China, suggests K/S/V 
underestimates the DRA for developing countries. 16 
 
Table 4 shows the NRAs for the farm sector’s import-competing and 
exportable sub-sectors, together with the trade bias index. Again the trend to 1984 in 
the weighted average NRA for each of the two sub-sectors for the full sample of 
developing countries is flat. But note that the degree of anti-trade bias in the 
agricultural NRAs is greater for the full sample than it was for the K/S/V sample of 17 
developing countries: the NRA averages for exportables is -44 percent and for 
importables is 13 percent for the full sample, compared with -25 and 7 percent, 
respectively, for the sample of just 17 countries. Thus the anti-trade bias index for the 
full sample is shown in the final column of table 2 to be much greater for the full 
sample than for the 17 countries: -0.50 compared with -0.30 (or -0.24 according to 
K/S/V’s DRAs). 
Table 5, which includes NRAs for non-farm tradable sectors, reveals that for 
the full sample the RRA too is lower than for the K/S/V sample of 17 countries in the 
period to 1984. Latin America and Asia had very high rates of manufacturing 
protection in that period, and they were especially high in China and India which were 
not included in the K/S/V study. Since those two are large economies, the weighted 
average NRA for all developing country producers of non-farm tradables is estimated 
to be 47 percent for the 1960-84 period, generating a weighted average RRA of -49 
percent compared with the unweighted average rate of -29 percent for the K/S/V 
sample (or -30 percent based on K/S/V’s TRA).  
Together these new findings suggest the broad qualitative conclusions drawn 
from the K/S/V study of two decades ago would not have altered had they included 
more products and more countries in their sample. However, with a bigger sample 
they would have been able to stress their policy implications even more forcefully, as 
the estimated magnitudes of the anti-agricultural and anti-trade bias indicators would 
have been  both larger by two-thirds. 
 
 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in High-Income Countries pre-1985 
 
 
Tables 3 to 5 also show the new project’s estimated weighted average NRAs and 
RRAs for high-income countries, which include all the significant economies of 
Western Europe plus Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States, 17 
 
from which several points are worth stressing. First, the agricultural NRAs were 
already more than 20 percent by the latter 1950s, and they doubled over the period to 
1984 (dipping only slightly in the mid-1970s when international food prices spiked 
upwards). This contrasts markedly with the developing country average NRA of 
below -20 percent in that era. Second, even exporting farmers in high-income 
countries were assisted, although much less so than import-competing farmers who 
enjoyed an NRA average that was more than three times that of import-competing 
farmers in developing countries. And third, with declines in manufacturing protection 
in high-income countries, their RRA average rose even more than their agricultural 
NRA average, from 14 percent in 1955-59 to 38 percent in 1980-84 and 51 percent in 
1985-89. Together these estimates mean that farmers in developing countries were 
harmed in the K/S/V era not only by their own countries’ agricultural and non-farm 
policies but also – and increasingly from the latter 1950s to the latter 1980s – by 
competition in world markets from high-income countries that was enhanced by those 
countries’ pro-agricultural policies. 
 
 
Distortions to Agricultural Iincentives since 1985 
 
 
The bottom panel of table 2 provides NRA and RRA estimates post-1984 for the 17 
countries in the K/S/V sample. Comparing them with the middle panel reveals that 
those countries reduced substantially their taxation of export agriculture, raised their 
protection of import-competing agriculture and as a result their overall agricultural 
NRA switched from an average of -8 percent in 1960-84 to 10 percent in 1985-2004. 
Meanwhile, the NRA for non-farm tradables fell by two-thirds, such that the RRA for 
this sample rose from -29 percent to 1 percent. The anti-agricultural bias in those 17 
developing countries thus disappeared on average, although the anti-trade bias within 
their farm sectors increased slightly (trade bias index rose from -0.30 to -0.38). These 
broad findings are true also for the bigger sample of 41 developing countries (with the 
exception of the anti-trade bias which diminished), even though the magnitudes are 
generally larger – see final row of middle and bottom panels of table 2. 
To focus on just the covered farm products for which direct price comparisons 
have been made, figure 1 summarizes the trends in NRAs and reveals a marked 18 
 
difference in the levels of support to import-competing versus exportable farm 
products. Exportables in developing countries were taxed heavily from the late 1950s 
until the mid-1980s but then that taxation was gradually phased out (although some 
taxes remained in 2000-04, for example in Argentina). Importables, by contrast, have 
been assisted increasingly throughout the past five decades in developing countries on 
average (even though some import subsidization of staple foods occurred from time to 
time in low-income countries), and the long-run fitted trend line has almost the same 
slope for developing countries as for high-income countries (compare the upper and 
lower graphs in figure 1).
16
  The net effect of all the explicit and implicit trade taxes and subsidies, together 
with domestic taxes and subsidies on tradable farm products, is that the NRA for 
exportable farm products is typically well below the NRA for importables, so that the 
trade bias index, as defined in the methodology section above, is negative. Table 4 
shows that the agricultural trade bias index has steadily become less negative since the 
late 1980s for the developing country group, but mainly because of the decline in 
agricultural export taxation and in spite of growth in agricultural import protection.  
   
The two sub-sectors to which that trade bias index’s NRAs refer (exportable 
and import-competing farm products, respectively) are not equal contributors to 
overall farm production, however, so the TBI when weighted across numerous 
products/countries is not a perfect indicator. It also ignores distortions to consumer 
prices which need not be identical to producer distortions. A superior indicator is the 
trade reduction index discussed in the methodology section above. The TRI associated 
with NRAs and CTEs for covered agricultural products has fallen substantially from 
its peak in the mid-1980s for Africa and Asia, as it has for high-income countries 
(figure 2). That is, the considerable extent of decline in the anti-trade bias in farm 
policies indicated by the trade bias index is confirmed by the TRI measure. 
The fall in the TRI has been more because of the fall in national mean NRAs 
than in their variance, however. The regional average NRAs hide a great deal of 
diversity across products and countries, including within each region. One way of 
summarizing the within-country NRA diversity across products is to calculate the 
standard deviation around the mean NRA for all covered farm products each year. 
                                                 
16 Both developing and high-income country NRAs for import-competing farm products rise in the 
latter 1980s. This is because of the slump in international food prices in 1986 that was far from fully 
transmitted to domestic markets, and so lowered the denominator far more than the numerator of the 
NRA calculation.  19 
 
Even when that is averaged over whole geographic regions, the diversity is still 
evident, and it has not declined much since the K/S/V era for Africa and Latin 
America (from 34 and 49 percent in 1965-1984, respectively, to 29 and 40 percent in 
1985-2004) and it has risen for Asian developing countries (from 50 to 61 percent – 
see Anderson, table 1.6). This has important welfare implications, because the cost of 
government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend to 
be greater the greater the degree of substitution in production (Lloyd), which is high 
in the case of agriculture where farm land is sector-specific but transferable among 
farm activities. 
The increase in the RRA for developing countries began slowly in the 1970s 
but accelerated over the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed the RRA was slightly above zero by 
the end of the 20
th century (table 5 and figure 3). That is, the removal of the anti-
agricultural bias in developing countries has been a gradual process, but it is 
nonetheless remarkable that in just the one generation since the K/S/V era that bias 
has all but disappeared except in Africa. Slightly over half of the rise in the RRA for 
developing countries since the mid-1980s is due to falls in protection to producers of 
non-farm tradable goods, suggesting that much of the reduction in relative prices 
faced by farmers over the past two decades can be attributed to general trade 
liberalization rather than to farm-specific policy reform. 
Governments in the past tried to alter not only the trend level of farm prices 
but also to reduce their year-to-year fluctuations. Typically this was done by varying 
the restrictions on international trade according to seasonal conditions domestically 
and changes in prices internationally. Effectively this involves exporting domestic 
instability and not importing instability from abroad. When many countries indulge in 
such insulating behavior it ‘thins’ international markets for farm products, making 
them more volatile and thereby encouraging even more countries to insulate. To see 
how much that type of intervention has changed since the K/S/V era, table 6 reports 
the average across focus countries of the percentage point deviation each year of 
national NRAs for 12 key farm products around their trend value, for the sub-periods 
before and from 1985. For the majority of products that indicator is lower in the latter 
period, in both developing and high-income countries.
17
                                                 
17 That this indicator tends to be much less in developing than high-income countries is mainly a 
reflection of the fact that the absolute values of the agricultural NRAs tend to be smaller in developing 
countries (see table 5). 
 This is yet another way in 20 
 
which distortions to agricultural incentives for developing countries have diminished 
since the mid-1980s – but note the important exceptions of rice and wheat in table 6. 
  How has the importance of different policy instruments changed since the 
K/S/V era? Traditionally in developing countries, trade measures at the border (export 
and import taxes or subsidies and their equivalent from quantitative trade restrictions 
and multiple exchange rates) have been the dominant forms of intervention. Table 7 
shows the various contributions of different policy measures to the overall estimated 
NRAs as of 1981-84 and 2000-04. In the earlier period, trade measures accounted for 
more than three-quarters of the total agricultural NRA for developing (and also high-
income) countries. In the latter period, trade measures were much less of a contributor 
in developing countries, and most of that came from import barriers whereas in the 
earlier period it came mainly from export barriers. Production taxes have also 
declined substantially. What is now more important in developing countries, both 
relatively and absolutely, are net subsidies to farm inputs and other non-product-
specific assistance. The most notable case is India, where large subsidies to fertilizer, 
water and power for irrigation add several percentage points to India’s agricultural 
NRA (Anderson, Ch. 10).  
Trade measures are responsible for an even larger share – over 90 percent – of 
the distortion to consumer prices of food, since direct domestic consumer subsidies or 
taxes, as distinct from the indirect ones provided by border measures, are relatively 
rare (lower half of table 7). The dominance of trade measures in both consumer tax 
equivalents (CTEs) and NRAs for agricultural products means we should expect those 
two indicators to be highly correlated. And indeed that is the case: for all focus 
countries, all covered products and all available years in the panel set, the coefficient 
of correlation between farm product NRAs and CTEs is 0.93. 
  Finally, how are the above policy reforms reflected in the welfare reduction 
index? This single indicator captures the partial equilibrium welfare effect of each 
country’s regime of price distortions for covered agricultural products in place at any 
time (while ignoring non-covered farm products and indirect effects of sectoral and 
trade policy measures directed at non-agricultural sectors). The WRI measure reflects 
the welfare cost of agricultural price-distorting policies better than the NRA or CTE 
because it includes the distortions on both sides of a market and it recognizes that the 
welfare cost of a government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the 
price wedge. It thus captures the disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak levels 21 
 
of assistance or taxation, and is larger than the mean and is positive regardless of 
whether the government’s agricultural policy is favoring or hurting farmers. In this 
way the WRI goes some way towards indicating what a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) can provide in the way of estimates of the welfare effects of the 
price distortions captured by the product NRA and CTE estimates, while having the 
advantage of providing an annual time series of this sectoral indicator.  
The WRI five-year results in figure 4 indicate a fairly constant tendency in 
developing countries for their covered products’ policies to reduce economic welfare 
from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, but thereafter that indicator nearly halves in the 
1990s. This pattern is generated by different policy regimes in the different country 
groups though, as the WRI has the desirable property of correctly identifying the 
welfare consequences that result from both positive and negative assistance regimes, 
and the larger the variance in assistance levels the greater the potential for resources 
to be used in activities which do not maximize economic welfare and hence the larger 
the WRI. One consequence is that the WRI for Africa spikes in the mid-1980s – in 
contrast to the NRA, which moves close to zero. The reason is that while Africa was 
still taxing exportables it had moved (temporarily) from low to very high positive 
levels of protection for import-competing farm products when international food 
prices slumped in 1986 (table 4). At the aggregate level African farmers received 
almost no government assistance then (NRA close to zero), but the welfare cost of its 
mixture of agricultural policies as a whole was at its highest according to the WRI. 
Another consequence is that for developing countries its average WRI in the years 
1995 to 2004 is around 20 percent even though its average NRA for covered products 
in those years is close to zero (see figure 1(a)), again reflecting the high dispersion 
across product NRAs – particularly between exportables and import-competing goods 
– in each country.  
By way of summary of both the WRI and TRI estimates, table 8 provides the 
mean and the log-linear regression growth rate of each of those indicators for the 
K/S/V era and for the period since 1984. It shows them separately for the K/S/V 
countries broken down into their income groups, as well as for all developing 
countries in the new database and for high-income countries. Several points are worth 
noticing from this table.  
First, in terms of the mean WRI and TRI, the 17 K/S/V countries have almost 
the same values as the fuller sample of 41 developing countries for the period 1960-22 
 
84, at around 44 and 24 percent, respectively. The two samples differed in terms of 
growth in those indexes over those years, however: the trade- and welfare-reducing 
effects of policies in the smaller K/S/V sample increased 3 or 4 times faster than in 
the fuller sample of 41 developing countries, suggesting the more-limited sample 
would have exaggerated the growth in those indexes for developing countries. 
Second, the K/S/V sample was not very representative of the fuller developing 
country sample in the more-recent 1985-2004 period: the mean WRI and TRI are each 
more than half as large again in the latter period as in the former period for the K/S/V 
countries, whereas for the fuller sample those means fell by roughly one-fifth. That 
contrast is clear also in the rates of (negative) growth of the indexes over the latter 25 
years, which fell much faster in the full sample than in the sample of just 17 countries. 
Third, there is a U shape in the mean WRI and TRI values across income 
groups: they become lower as one moves from the lowest income group to Group II 
and then Group III but then are highest for Group IV. This is consistent with the 
decline in the negative agricultural NRA as one goes from Group I through to Group 
III and then the move to a large positive NRA for Group IV (see middle panel of table 
2 above). That U shape is similar in the later period except the means for Group III 
are lower (its policies are less welfare- and trade-reducing than in the earlier period) 
and those for Group IV are higher (its policies are more than twice as welfare- and 
trade-reducing as those of the earlier period). 
Fourth, by region it is only in Latin America that the trade-reducing aspect of 
agricultural policies has diminished substantially, and it is more in Africa than in 
Latin America that the welfare-reducing aspect of agricultural policies has 
diminished. For Asia both indexes are similar in the two periods, but that hides much 
diversity of reform experiences within the region, with protection growth in such 
countries as South Korea offsetting the dramatic reforms in such countries as China. 
And fifth, the mean WRI and TRI in the earlier period were half as large again 
for high-income countries as for the 41 developing countries (and 2.5 times larger for 
the European Union), and that gap became even wider by the more-recent period. This 
is reflected too in the faster increase in these indexes during the early period and their 
slower decline (especially for non-EU countries) in the later period.  
 
 




It is clear from the above that there has been a great deal of change over the past 
quarter of a century in policy distortions to agricultural incentives throughout the 
world, and considerable diversity in the rates and types of change. In addition to the 
anti-agricultural and anti-trade biases of policies of many developing countries being 
reduced since the K/S/V era, export subsidies of high-income countries have been cut 
and some re-instrumentation toward less inefficient and less trade-distorting forms of 
support, particularly in Western Europe, has begun. However, protection from 
agricultural import competition has continued to be on an upward trend in developing 
countries, if one ignores the latter 1980s when the limited transmission of the slump in 
international food prices to domestic markets led to NRAs spiking upwards.  
What, then, have been the net economic effects of agricultural price and trade 
policy changes around the world since the early 1980s? Also, how do the effects on 
farm incomes and economic welfare in developing countries compare with the effects 
of those price distortions still in place as of 2004? Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe 
and Anderson use a global economy-wide model (the World Bank’s Linkage model – 
see van der Mensbrugghe) to provide a combined retrospective and prospective 
analysis that seeks to assess how far the world has come, and how far it still has to go, 
in removing the disarray in world agriculture. It quantifies the impacts both of past 
reforms and current policies by comparing the effects of the above NRA and CTE 
distortion estimates for the period 1980-84 with those of 2004.  
Several key findings from that economy-wide modeling study, summarized in 
table 8, are worth emphasizing. First, the policy reforms from the early 1980s to the 
mid-2000s is estimated to have improved global economic welfare by $233 billion per 
year, and removing the distortions remaining as of 2004 would add another $168 
billion per year. This suggests that in a global welfare sense the world moved three-
fifths of the way towards global free trade in goods over that quarter century. 
Second, developing countries benefited proportionately more than high-
income economies (1.0 percent compared with 0.7 percent of national income) from 
those past policy reforms, and would gain nearly twice as much as high-income 
countries by completing that reform process (an average increase of 0.9 percent 
compared with 0.5 percent for high-income countries). Of those prospective welfare 
gains from global liberalization, 70 percent would come from agriculture and food 24 
 
policy reform. This is a striking result given that the shares of agriculture and food in 
global GDP and global merchandise trade are only 3 and 6 percent, respectively. The 
contribution of farm and food policy reform to the prospective welfare gain for just 
developing countries is slightly greater, at 72 percent. 
Third, the developing countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural 
exports rose from 43 to 55 percent, and its farm output share from 58 to 62 percent, 
because of those reforms, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice 
and sugar. Removing remaining goods market distortions would boost their export 
and output shares to 64 and 65 percent, respectively. 
Fourth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in 
agriculture) is estimated to be 4.9 percent higher than it would have been without the 
reforms of the past quarter century, which is more than ten times the proportional gain 
for non-agriculture. If policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm incomes in 
developing countries would rise a further 5.6 percent, compared with just 1.9 percent 
for non-agricultural value added. As well, returns to unskilled workers in developing 
countries – the majority of whom work on farms – would rise more than returns to 
other productive factors from that liberalization.  
 
 
Why Does This Matter? Where to From Here? 
 
   
The degree of distortions to K/S/V mattered in the late 1980s because policies of 
many developing countries at that time were harming their economies and especially 
their farmers. Since farm households were much poorer on average than non-farm 
households, these policies were not only national welfare-reducing but also 
contributing to inequality and poverty. The above comparison of K/S/V results and 
those of the new World Bank study reported in Anderson deepens our understanding 
of that 1960-1984 period of history and of the subsequent 20 years in the following 
ways: 
•  Had K/S/V had the same broader range of covered products, the larger sample 
of developing countries and the greater variety of indicators as in the new 
study, it would not have altered the earlier study’s key conclusions but it 
would have enabled the authors to stress their policy implications even more 25 
 
forcefully, as the estimated magnitudes of the anti-agricultural and anti-trade 
bias indicators would have been larger by about two-thirds;
18
•  The new measures of  distortions to farmer incentives in high-income 
countries confirm that developing country farmers were also being harmed 
increasingly by rich-country policies during that period to the mid-1980s; 
 
•  Since the mid-1980s, many developing countries have undertaken national 
policy reforms that have reduced substantially the inter-sectoral bias against 
agriculture and, within the farm sector, the anti-trade bias of the past – and 
more so, and at a faster pace, for the fuller sample of developing countries 
than for the K/S/V sample; 
•  Nonetheless, many distortions remain within the agricultural sector even in 
those countries with RRAs close to zero, and even where import restrictions 
are the main distortionary measure (suggesting tariffs are far from uniform, 
not to mention subsidies); 
•  In a global welfare sense the world moved three-fifths of the way towards 
global free trade in goods over the quarter century since the early 1980s 
which, while impressive and gratifying, means there is still another two-fifths 
of the way to go before these wasteful policies are finally abandoned; 
•  Developing countries have benefited proportionately (as a share of their GDP) 
more than high-income economies from those policy reforms, and would 
gain nearly twice as much as high-income countries by completing that 
reform process (of which 72 percent of those prospective gains to developing 
countries would come from agriculture and food policy reform); and 
•  Net farm income (agricultural value added) in developing countries is 
estimated to be 5 percent higher than they would have been without the 
reforms since the early 1980s, which is more than ten times the proportional 
gain to non-agricultural households, and if policies remaining in 2004 were 
removed those net farm incomes would  rise a further 6 percent. 
                                                 
18 Indeed even the new results for 41 developing countries may under-state the degree of anti-
agricultural bias in policies, since those 41 are larger, richer and less agrarian than the non-focused 
developing countries. A new study using simple political econometrics suggests the agricultural NRA 
of the latter group in 2000-04 could be 10 percentage points lower than for the 41 focus countries. Even 
so, their share of all developing country agriculture is sufficiently small that their inclusion would have 
lowered the aggregate NRA for developing countries by 10 percentage point, from 9 to 8 percent 
(Anderson et al., table 2.13). 26 
 
Together, these findings suggest both inequality and poverty could be further 
alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world’s poor are in farm 
households in developing countries (World Bank 2008).
19
  Ideally the reform processes of the past quarter century would continue, 
boosting global economic growth, reducing inequality within and between countries, 
and alleviating poverty. If the convergence of national RRAs towards zero continues 
(from below by most developing countries and from above by higher-income 
countries), there would continue to be a re-location of global farm production (in 
global share terms) from high-income to developing countries, reversing the policy 
distortion-driven opposite trend in the quarter century prior to the mid-1980s. 
Whether international food prices would rise or fall would depend on the relative size 
of the two groups of countries and which had the larger RRA change (bearing in mind 
that some export restrictions still remain, including in Argentina). According to the 
global modeling exercise reported in table 9, the net change in international prices 
would be very small if all goods market distortions as of 2004 were removed globally. 
Those results also suggest international markets would be ‘thicker’, so their volatility 
from year to year would be less, further boosting global food security. 
 Furthermore, those latter 
results are from a comparative static economy-wide model and so underestimate the 
gains by ignoring the dynamic gains that typically accompany market liberalization.  
  That rosy scenario would imply that the early 1960s to the mid-1980s was an 
aberrant period of welfare-reducing policy divergence (negative and very low RRAs 
in newly independent developing countries, positive and rising RRAs in most high-
income countries) that has given way to growth-enhancing, welfare-improving and 
inequality- and poverty-reducing reforms during which the two country groups’ 
RRAs, like their NRAs, are converging towards zero. In this view the reforms could 
be seen as the result of learning from the differing growth experiences of more- and 
less-open developing economies. 
An alternative interpretation of history is that it is the most recent 25-year 
period of RRA changes that is aberrant. The RRA declines in high-income countries, 
according to this alternative view, are associated more with, in the case of the EU, its 
1992 Single Market initiative and subsequent EU enlargements than with external 
                                                 
19 A new set of economy-wide national and global modeling studies that uses the NRA agricultural 
distortion estimates in Anderson finds that removal of those and distortions to other tradable goods 
markets does indeed lower estimated inequality and poverty. See Anderson, Cockburn and Martin. 27 
 
reform pressure from other World Trade Organization (WTO) members,
20
Moreover, when the RRA is plotted against the log of real per capita income 
and straight regression lines are estimated for developing and high-income countries, 
they both slope upward and at the same rate (figure 5). True, the intercept on the 
vertical axis for the developing countries’ trend line is lower than that for high-income 
countries. Nonetheless, in developing countries there are few signs of a slowdown of 
the upward trend in agricultural protection from import competition over the time 
period studied.
 and with 
the fact that the high protection rates of the mid-1980s represent a temporary spike 
above trend caused by the very low international commodity prices then, and 
conversely for the low rates in 2007-08 reported by the OECD. As for the rise of 
developing country RRAs in this alternative view, that simply follows the example of 
higher-income countries and will not stop when those RRAs reach zero. Inspection of 
the NRAs in figure 1 for exporting and import-competing sub-sectors of developing 
country agriculture reveals that the convergence of aggregate NRAs to near zero is 
mainly with respect to the exporting sub-sector. NRAs for import-competing farmers 
in developing countries, by contrast, are positive and (if one ignores the latter 1980s 
when international food prices spiked downwards) are trending upwards over time.  
21
                                                 
20 See Swinnen. As explained by Josling, the budgetary cost of continuing with the EU’s past levels of 
support would have sky-rocketed following the EU membership expansion eastwards, with little if any 
of those extra payments going to the traditional lobbyists for the CAP. 
 On the contrary, there are numerous signs that developing country 
governments want to keep open their options to raise agricultural NRAs in the future, 
particularly via import restrictions. One indicator is the high tariff bindings to which 
developing countries committed themselves following the Uruguay Round: as of 
2001, actual applied tariffs on agricultural products averaged less than half the 
corresponding bound tariffs for developing countries of 48 percent, and less than one-
sixth in the case of least-developed countries (Anderson and Martin 2006, table 1.2). 
Another indicator of agricultural trade reform reluctance is the unwillingness of many 
developing countries to agree to major cuts in bound agricultural tariffs in the WTO’s 
on-going Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. More than that, the current 
negotiations have brought to prominence a new proposal for agricultural 
21 Certainly applied tariffs were lowered or suspended as a way of dealing with the international food 
price spike in 2008; but initial indications are that this, and the food export taxes or quantitative 
restrictions imposed that year by numerous food-exporting developing countries, lasted only until 
international prices returned close to their trend levels in 2009 (as happened after the price hike of 
1973-74 and the price dip of 1986-87). 28 
 
protectionism in developing countries. This is based on the notion that agricultural 
protection is helpful and needed for food security, livelihood security and rural 
development. This view has succeeded in bringing “Special Products” and a “Special 
Safeguard Mechanism” into the multilateral trading system’s agricultural negotiations, 
despite the fact that such policies, which would raise domestic food prices in 
developing countries, may worsen poverty and the food security of the poor (Ivanic 
and Martin). 
These two alternative interpretations of history have profoundly different 
implications for the future. The first suggests that the WTO’s Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations is likely to conclude with substantial cuts to agricultural 
tariff and subsidy bindings that lock in recent reforms and go close to relegating 
protectionism in agricultural markets to history. In that case world food price trends 
would simply depend on whether improvements in farm versus nonfarm technologies 
could keep pace with the growth in global demand for farm products. That was 
certainly possible in the 20
th century (see Pfaffenzeller, Newbolt and Rayner) but, 
given the pace of climate change and the recent growth in demand for biofuels, it may 
be more of a challenge in the 21
st century especially if much of the world continues to 
shun genetically modified food. In particular, the emerging economies of China and 
India would become more food import-dependent as they continue to rapidly 
industrialize, should their RRAs cease rising and instead stay at their present near-
zero levels.  
The other interpretation of history – one that views as normal a movement 
from taxing to subsidizing farmers as an economy develops – suggests the Doha 
Round will struggle to reach an ambitious reform outcome in agriculture, and that 
developing countries will make use of the legal wiggle room they have allowed 
themselves in their WTO bindings to follow Japan, Korea and Taiwan into higher 
levels of agricultural protection. In that case international food prices would rise less 
than in the first scenario, but domestic food prices in developing countries, 
particularly for importables, would rise relative to international prices. If this is the 
more realistic interpretation of history, it places much more weight on the role of the 
economics profession in contuning to expound the virtues of governments keeping out 
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Figure 1: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all 
covered agricultural products,






























a Covered products only. The total also includes nontradables. 
 
Source: Author’s derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela 34 
 
Figure 2: Trade Reduction Indexes for covered tradable farm products, by 
region, 1960 to 2007 (%) 
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural 
tradable products and relative rate of assistance, all focus developing countries,
a 
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a Weighted averages across countries, using agricultural production valued at 
undistorted prices as weights. 
 
Source: Author’s derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela 36 
 
Figure 4: Welfare Reduction Indexes for covered tradable farm products, by 
region, 1960 to 2007 (%) 
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Figure 5: Relationships between real GDP per capita and RRA, all 75 focus 
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  Coefficient  Standard error  R
2 
DCs  0.26   0.02  0.17 
HICs  0.28  0.03  0.14 
 




Table 1: Summary of NRA/CTE/RRA coverage statistics, World Bank 
agricultural distortions project 
 
Number and size of countries  Number  % of 2000-04 global: 
        Popn.  Ag GDP 
    Africa  21  11  7 
    Asia  12  51  37 
    Latin America  8  7  8 
    SUB-TOTAL, all DCs  41  69  52 
    European transition econs  14  7  7 
    High-income countries  20  14 
    TOTAL 
33 
75  92  92 
     
Number of years covered  Maximum  Av. per country 
    Africa  51  43 
    Asia  53  42 
    Latin America  51  39 
    SUB-TOTAL, all DCs  53  43 
    European transition econs  47  17 
    High-income countries  53  52 
    TOTAL  51  41 
     
Number of products covered  Maximum  Av. per country 
    Africa  44  8 
    Asia  35  8 
    Latin America  27  10 
    SUB-TOTAL, all DCs  59  9 
    European transition econs  25  12 
    High-income countries  39  15 
    TOTAL  74  11 
     
Total number of NRA ests. 




Av. per country 
    Africa  7318  348 
    Asia  3546  296 
    Latin America  2881  360 
    SUB-TOTAL, focus DCs  13745  335 
    European transition econs  2847  203 
    High-income countries  13377  669 








Table 2: Estimates by K/S/V of the direct, indirect and total rates of assistance
a 
to farmers in 17 developing countries, by income group,
b and comparable NRA 
and RRA estimates, 1960-1984 and 1985-2004 (%, unweighted averages across 
countries) 
(a) K/S/V estimates, circa 1960-84 






















Group 1  18  -21  -23  -29 (-26)  -52  -0.33 
Group II  10  -16  -12  -25 (-35)  -37  -0.24 
Group III  14  2  -0  -16 (-23)  -16  -0.11 
Group IV  28  1  24  -14 (-14)  10  -0.21 










-30  -0.24 
 
(b)Anderson and Valenzuela estimates (circa 1960-84) 
















Exportable  Total (incl. 
nontradables)
d 
Group 1  -16  -50  -22  14  -44  -0.40 
Group II  4  -26  -13  49  -38  -0.29 
Group III  12  -7  -4  19  -21  -0.14 
Group IV  40  0  26  13  18  -0.29 
All 17 countries  7  -25  -8  34  -29  -0.30 
All 41 countries
f  13  -44  -22  47  -49  -0.50 
 
(c)Anderson and Valenzuela estimates (1985-2004) 
















Exportable  Total (incl. 
nontradables)
d 
Group 1  3  -45  -21  10  -35  -0.47 
Group II  30  -10  5  17  -8  -0.31 
Group III  38  -5  2  7  -4  -0.31 
Group IV  122  7  87  2  101  -0.52 
All 17 countries  38  -15  10  12  1  -0.38 40 
 
All 41 countries
f  26  -16  1  15  -14  -0.33 
a The three rates of assistance shown here are what Schiff and Valdes call ‘direct 
protection’, ‘indirect protection’ and ‘total protection’. Apart from rounding errors, 
column 3 is the production-weighted average of columns 1 and 2 and an unreported 
direct rate of assistance for nontradable farm products, and column 5 is the sum of 
columns 3 and 4. 
 
b Group 1 is Cote d’Ivoire (1960-82), Ghana (1955-77) and Zambia (1966-84); Group 
II is Argentina (1960-84), Colombia (1960-83), Dominican Rep. (1966-85), Egypt 
(1964-84), Pakistan (1960-86), Philippines (1960-86), Sri Lanka (1960-85), Thailand 
(1962-84) and Turkey (1961-83); Group III is Brazil (1969-83), Chile (1960-83) and 
Malaysia (1960-83); and Group IV is Rep. of Korea (1960-84) and Portugal (1960-
84). In the full K/S/V set of countries, Morocco is included in Group II and the total, 
but its exclusion makes no more than 1 percentage point difference to rows 2 and 5 of 
the K/S/V unweighted averages. It is therefore excluded here to aid comparison 
because Morocco was not included in the more-recent study reported in Anderson. 
 
c Numbers in parentheses are that due to manufacturing protection, which accounts for 
most of the indirect rate of assistance. 
 
d Includes also non-product-specific assistance to farmers and guesstimated NRAs for 
non-covered products (neither of which are included in the first two columns). In 
deriving the RRA, the NRA for just agricultural tradables is used. 
 
e Trade Bias Index, TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagx 
and NRAagm are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the exportable and 
import-competing parts of the agricultural sector shown in columns 1 and 2, with 
weights based on production valued at undistorted prices; and similarly for part (a) of 
the table using DRAs. 
 
f The full sample of 41 focus developing countries reflected in the subsequent tables. 
 




Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a focus countries, 1955 to 2007
c (%) 
   
   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa (14% of global per capita 
GDP)  -14  -8  -11  -15  -13  -8  -1  -9  -6  -7  na 
Asia (20% of global per capita GDP) 
  -27  -27  -25  -25  -24  -21  -9  -2  8  12  na 
Latin America (64% of global per 
capita GDP)  -11  -8  -7  -21  -18  -13  -11  4  6  5  na 
 
All developing countries  -26  -23  -22  -24  -22  -18  -8  -2  6  9  na 
                       
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
b 














na  10  18  18  25 
 
High-income countries (540% of 
global per capita GDP)  22  29  35  25  32  41  53  46  35  32  17 
 
 
All focus countries (wted. average):  3  5  6  0  2  5  17  18  17  18  na 
 
Source: Author’s derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela 
a. Weighted average for each country, including non-product specific assistance as well as authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm products 
(but not decoupled assistance), with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. Estimates for China pre-1981 
and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average 
NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that 
which gives the same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
Developing country and world aggregates are computed accordingly.  




Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural exportables, import-
competing products, and the trade bias index,
























Africa                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -30.1  -38.4  -42.6  -42.6  -35.0  -36.7  -35.8  -26.1  -24.6  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  18.6  11.8  1.9  14.5  13.2  58.3  5.2  9.8  1.6  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.41  -0.45  -0.44  -0.50  -0.43  -0.60  -0.39  -0.33  -0.26  na 
Latin America                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -20.4  -12.8  -27.0  -25.2  -27.1  -25.0  -10.5  -3.5  -4.6  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  26.3  8.7  -2.8  1.1  13.6  5.1  19.4  12.5  20.6  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.37  -0.20  -0.25  -0.26  -0.36  -0.29  -0.25  -0.14  -0.21  na 
South Asia
c                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -37.5  -37.2  -30.0  -36.1  -27.9  -20.6  -15.8  -12.0  -6.2  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  39.2  41.2  39.4  45.1  37.9  63.3  25.1  14.5  26.5  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.55  -0.56  -0.50  -0.56  -0.48  -0.51  -0.33  -0.23  -0.26  na 
China and Southeast Asia
c                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -55.5  -55.1  -51.8  -50.1  -50.0  -41.0  -20.8  -2.2  0.1  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  -10.3  -8.9  -9.4  -2.6  0.5  15.1  3.3  13.3  12.3  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.50  -0.51  -0.47  -0.49  -0.50  -0.49  -0.23  -0.14  -0.11  na 
Developing countries
c                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -46.5  -44.6  -45.4  -43.9  -41.4  -35.8  -18.7  -5.5  -3.0  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  12.7  13.5  7.8  12.8  16.5  37.7  22.6  22.0  23.0  na 
Trade Bias Index
   na  -0.53  -0.51  -0.49  -0.50  -0.50  -0.53  -0.34  -0.23  -0.21  na 
European transition econs.                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -3.2  -1.0  -1.0  15.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  32.5  35.4  35.7  32.3 
Trade Bias Index  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -0.27  -0.27  -0.27  -0.13 
High-income countries  
NRA agric. exportables  4.2  7.4  13.5  10.3  11.3  12.1  22.3  15.9  8.1  6.9  2.9 
NRA agric. imp-comp  31.2  45.9  50.2  36.5  47.4  58.1  71.4  62.4  53.9  50.7  30.8 
Trade Bias Index
   -0.21  -0.26  -0.24  -0.19  -0.24  -0.29  -0.29  -0.29  -0.30  -0.29  -0.21 
World 
c 
NRA agric. exportables  na  -23  -20  -23  -25  -24  -17  -7  -1  0  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  35  37  27  34  38  57  43  38  36  na 
Trade Bias Index   na  -0.43  -0.42  -0.39  -0.44  -0.45  -0.47  -0.35  -0.28  -0.26  na 
 
Source: Author’s derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela 
 
a. NRAs for non-covered products are included here (unlike in figure 1.3).  
 
b. Trade Bias Index, TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagx 
and NRAagm are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the exportable and 
import-competing parts of the agricultural sector, with weights based on production 
valued at undistorted prices. TBIs shown here are calculated using the regional 5-year 
averages of  NRAagx and NRAagm. 
 
c. Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that 
the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the 
average NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, 
and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that which gives the 
same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 
1965-69, respectively. The developing country and world averages are computed 
accordingly.   
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Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and nonagricultural 
tradables, and the RRA,
























Africa                       
NRA agric.   na  -13.3  -19.6  -25.0  -22.1  -13.5  -0.3  -15.4  -8.7  -12.0  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  3.7  2.7  1.5  5.7  1.6  9.2  2.7  2.0  7.3  na 
RRA  na  -15.2  -21.4  -26.0  -25.9  -13.1  -8.3  -17.1  -10.4  -18.0  na 
Latin America                       
NRA agric.   na  -11.4  -9.3  -23.0  -19.0  -12.9  -11.2  4.4  5.5  4.9  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  26.9  31.3  27.8  23.3  18.5  16.8  7.3  6.6  5.4  na 
RRA  na  -30.2  -30.9  -39.8  -34.2  -26.6  -24.0  -2.7  -1.0  -0.5  na 
South Asia
b                       
NRA agric.   na  4.1  4.4  9.7  -7.7  1.8  47.1  0.2  -2.4  12.7  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  114.4  117.8  81.7  57.8  54.6  39.9  18.6  15.0  10.1  na 
RRA  na  -51.5  -51.9  -39.8  -41.6  -33.3  5.1  -15.5  -14.9  3.4  na 
China and Southeast Asia
b                       
NRA agric.   na  -43.6  -42.6  -40.1  -35.7  -34.5  -27.8  -12.0  4.9  7.1  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  36.5  36.5  33.7  30.8  20.6  23.3  19.8  9.6  5.5  na 
RRA  na  -58.7  -58.0  -55.2  -50.8  -43.4  -41.6  -26.4  -4.2  1.5  na 
Developing countries
b 
NRA agric.   na  -24.0  -27.3  -31.9  -25.5  -21.0  -15.6  -3.9  4.0  7.4  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  58.3  60.0  45.8  37.3  34.6  27.0  16.7  9.8  6.3  na 
RRA  na  -52.0  -54.5  -53.3  -45.8  -41.3  -33.6  -17.6  -5.3  1.1  na 
European transition econs.                       
NRA agric.   na  na  na  na  na  na  na  10.0  18.3  16.1  17.0 
NRA non-agric.  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  9.8  5.5  4.6  2.7 
RRA  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.1  12.2  11.0  13.9 
High-income countries  
NRA agric.   23.0  30.9  36.8  26.5  34.7  43.0  55.5  48.2  36.6  33.9  18.3 
NRA non-agric.  7.5  8.5  7.7  5.4  3.6  3.4  3.2  2.5  1.7  1.3  -0.7 
RRA  14.3  20.6  27.1  19.9  30.1  38.3  50.6  44.6  34.3  32.1  19.2 
World
b 
NRA agric.   na  5.6  7.6  0.8  2.6  5.7  18.7  19.7  18.4  18.6  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  19.0  20.5  16.1  13.7  10.0  9.8  7.6  6.0  4.0  na 
RRA  na  -11.3  -10.7  -13.2  -9.8  -3.6  8.1  11.3  11.8  14.0  na 
 
Source: Author’s derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela 
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
b. Estimates for the RRA for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the 
assumption that the agricultural NRAs in those years were the same as the average 
NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the 
value of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share 
of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
Developing and world country aggregates are computed accordingly.  
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Table 6: Deviation of national NRA around its trend value,
a 12 key covered farm 
products,
b developing and high-income countries, 1965-84 and 1985-2004 (NRA 
percentage points) 
 
  Developing countries  High-income countries 
   1965-1984  1985-2004  1965-1984  1985-2004 
Grains, oils, sugar         
Rice  32  64  66  229 
Wheat  33  47  80  91 
Maize  36  33  53  58 
Soybean  46  117  75  61 
Sugar  53  66  179  173 
Tropical  cash crops         
Cotton  38  33  42  28 
Coconut  22  20  na  na 
Coffee  41  27  na  na 
Livestock products         
Milk  76  69  239  190 
Beef  45  52  128  127 
Pigmeat  81  60  92  77 
Poultry  109  74  164  197 
 
a Deviation is computed as the absolute value of (residual – trend NRA) where trend 
NRA in each of the two sub-periods is obtained by regressing NRA on time. 
 
b Unweighted average of  national deviations. 
 
Source: Authors’ derivation, using data in Anderson and Valenzuela 
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Table 7: Contributions to total agricultural NRA and CTE from different policy 
instruments,
a developing and high-income countries, 1981-84 and 2000–04 (%) 
 















Import tax equivalent  6  34  8  24 
Export subsidies  1  2  1  1 
Export tax equivalent  -20  0  -3  0 
Import subsidy equivalent  -2  0  -1  0 
ALL BORDER MEASURES  -15  36  5  25 
Domestic measures         
Production subsidies  1  2  1  1 
Production taxes  -5  0  -1  0 
Net subsidies to farm inputs  1  3  2  2 
Non-product-specific assistance   1  1  2  5 
ALL PRODUCTION SUPPORTS  -2  6  4  8 
         
Decoupled payments to farmers  0  6  0  11 
TOTAL NRA (including decoupled)  -17  48  9  44 
         
         
         
(b) CTE         
Border measures         
        Import tax equivalent  10  46  10  32 
        Export subsidies  1  2  1  1 
        Export tax equivalent  -22  0  -2  0 
        Import subsidy equivalent  -3  0  -1  0 
        ALL BORDER MEASURES  -14  48  8  33 
Domestic measures         
        Consumption subsidies  -1  0  -1  -6 
        Consumption taxes  0  0  1  0 
ALL CONSUMPTION MEASURES  -1  0  0  -6 
TOTAL CTE   -15  48  8  27 
         
a In the absence of data, we assume the share of input tax/subsidy, domestic 
production tax/subsidy and border tax/subsidies for non-covered farm products is the 
same as that for covered farm products. The first period begins in 1981 because that 
was the first year for which estimates for China are available. 
b All table entries have been generated by dividing the Gross Subsidy Equivalent of 
all (including decoupled) measures by the total agricultural sector’s gross production 
valued at undistorted prices.  
Source: Author’s derivation, using distortion data in Anderson and Valenzuela  
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Table 8: WRI and TRI averages and growth rates,
a developing and high-income countries,
b 1960-1984 and 1985-2004 (%) 
 
  1960-1984  1985-2004 
K/S/V income group  Mean (%)  Growth rate (% p.a.)  Mean (%)  Growth rate (% p.a.) 
 (poorest first):  WRI  TRI  WRI  TRI  WRI  TRI  WRI  TRI 
    Group 1  45  23  0.8  1.1  42  24  -0.7  0.1 
    Group II  38  12  -0.1  0.0  37  16  -0.4  -0.4 
    Group III  31  15  0.6  0.5  23  7  -1.8  -0.9 
    Group IV  63  42  2.2  3.1  155  128  0.6  0.3 
   17 K/S/V countries  44  23  0.9  1.2  64  44  -0.6  -0.2 
All 41 developing 
countries  44  25  0.2  0.4  34  21  -1.4  -1.4 
    Africa  43  25  0.5  0.9  33  23  -1.4  -1.6 
    Asia  51  22  0.0  0.0  51  24  -1.5  -1.5 
    LAC  35  19  0.3  -0.1  30  11  -1.0  -0.5 
All high-income 
countries  65  32  0.6  0.3  73  37  -1.3  -0.7 
    EU15  110  55  0.2  0.0  75  42  -2.2  -1.3 
    Other high-income  33  15  1.0  0.6  72  34  -0.7  -0.3 
a.  The average annual compound growth rates are the beta coefficients from a regression of the log variable on time for the period 
shown. In order to obtain a natural logarithm, the WRI indicator used is not as a percentage but rather as a coefficient, defined as (1 + 
WRI/100); and similarly for the TRI. 
b.  See table 2 for the classification of K/S/V’s 17 developing countries in the 4 income groups shown. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on estimates in Anderson and Croser  
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Table 9: Effects of reforming global goods markets between 1980-84 and 2004, 
and of removing remaining price and trade distortions as of 2004 
 
 
  Reform from 
1980-84 to 2004 
 
 
Move to free 
trade as of 2004 
Global econ welfare, $b (%)  $233b (0.8%)  $168b (0.6%) 
DCs’ econ welfare, $b (%)  $73b (1.0%)  $65b (0.9%) 
DC share of global ag output  58% 62%  62% 65% 
DC share of global ag exports  43% 55%  55% 64% 
% rise in DC ag (nonag) VA  4.9% (0.4%)  5.6% (1.9%) 
% rise in international agricultural 
and food prices 
13%  <1% 
 
Source: Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson 
 